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Introductory Remarks 
 
In the course of the negotiations for Bulgaria’s and Romania’s accession to the European 
Union the EU realized that, with the admission of these two countries, it would also 
share, via the Black Sea, common maritime borders with several more countries which, 
with all their interests and problems, used to be far away from Europe. All of a sudden, 
the entire Black Sea region acquired importance for Europe in terms of economics, 
energy and security questions. 
Taking this into account, the geopolitical focus of the EU had to be reconsidered. 
Up until then, the approaches were multi-dimensional: EU initiatives ran parallel to 
enhanced bilateral co-operation between single EU states and countries in the Black Sea 
region. There is still no consistent European strategy in sight. Occupied with internal 
affairs, failing to adopt a constitution, which would enable the EU to speak with a single 
voice, and having to digest the eastern enlargement by twelve new member states during 
the past three years, the EU is still in the process of becoming aware of its new 
geographic position. The Black Sea is not yet recognized as a ″European″ Sea.3 Georgia, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Moldova are state names, which are hardly familiar to average 
Western European citizens, who are generally unable to locate these countries on a world 
map. 
But what is the reason for this lack of knowledge? And what, as a matter of fact, does the 
Wider Black Sea region mean and what does it include? What are the challenges and 
opportunities of a future EU-Black Sea co-operation? This analysis aims at giving some 
possible answers to these relevant questions. Since this article originates from a 
conference, which was conducted in Baku/Azerbaijan, the main emphasis will be on EU-
South Caucasian relations. 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Petersen, Phillip A, The Black Sea: Frontier Zone or ″European″ Sea?, in: Review of International Affairs, No. 
1122, June 2006, pp. 23. For the EU’s position as a de facto Black Sea player see also: Aydin, Mustafa, Europe’s 
next shore: The Black Sea region after EU enlargement. EU-ISS Occasional Paper 53, June 2004, p. 1. 
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An Outline of Past Euro-Atlantic-Black Sea Relations 
 
Discussing the Black Sea region from a Western European point of view demands, for a 
start, a glance at the world map. Six countries – Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Russia, 
Georgia, and Turkey – directly border on the sea. However, there are additional states, 
such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Greece and Moldova, which closely identify themselves with 
the Black Sea region. Further nearby states would be: Albania, Belarus, Macedonia, 
Montenegro, and Serbia. 
A focus on the Black Sea basin could even include Austria, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and 
finally Slovenia.4 And indeed, the interest of most of the aforementioned countries in the 
Black Sea region is increasing, as it becomes obvious by, for instance, looking at the 
expanding Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). On 12 April 2004, Serbia and 
Montenegro became the twelfth member of BSEC. Austria, Egypt, France, Germany, 
Israel, Italy, Poland, Slovakia and, as of September 2005, the United States, have 
demonstrated their interest in the region by having ″observer″ status in BSEC.5 Thus, a 
wider definition of the Black Sea region, including more than those states directly 
bordering the sea seems appropriate. However, as a result of recent history, regional 
identity and the wish for co-operation have only just begun developing. BSEC member 
states belong to different cultural groups, countries with Islamic majorities border Roman 
Catholic or Christian Orthodox countries, some with democratic, some with communist 
traditions. This has led to various interethnic conflicts and wars, whose outcomes still 
affect relations between neighbour states, nation states and seceding entities, or ethnic 
groups within the same state borders. 
Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Black Sea, apart from the Turkish 
coast, was part of and in the sphere of Soviet influence. Immediately after the dissolution 
of the USSR, this perception changed very little. The region was considered to be part of 
the Russian periphery, where the Euro-Atlantic Alliance was reluctant to interfere. 
                                                 
4 Aydin, Mustafa, Europe’s next shore: The Black Sea region after EU enlargement. EU-ISS Occasional Paper 53, 
June 2004, p. 5, and for further information about memberships in various sub-regional organizations see: ibid, p. 
28. 
5 The EU being present at least as an observer is not yet the case, but needs to be considered in the near future. 
However, the European Commission has already become an observer in the Black Sea Commission. See also: 
Vahl, Marius, The EU and Black Sea Regional Cooperation: Some Challenges for BSEC, CEPS Commentaries, 
April 2005, p. 2. 
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Building a new co-operative relationship with Moscow had top priority then.6 Apart from 
that, in Western eyes, the Black Sea was not considered to be part of Europe (at least not 
its Eastern edges). Inadequate knowledge about the region, its people, culture, and its 
problems helped maintain this view. Rather than looking so far abroad, the European 
Union focused on its proximate backyard. The wars on the Balkan brought war back to 
the European continent. To stop them, the EU was dependent on NATO’s support. 
When NATO opened its ranks for Eastern European member states, the EU did the 
same. The Eastern enlargement captured the EU’s entire attention for the next few years. 
Even today, the EU is focused largely on its own backyard: the Balkans. Since February 
2006, the EU has been heavily involved in the negotiations on Kosovo’s final status. The 
next EU enlargement round will concentrate on the Balkan region.7 
It was only with the US focus on direct access to bases and operational routes in 
Central Asia and the Middle East, and with the consideration of alternative pipeline 
routes, bypassing the Russian Federation, that the importance of the Black Sea was finally 
recognized. In times of growing scarcity of raw materials, the Euro-Atlantic interests in 
the oil fields of the Caspian Sea seemed to herald a new great game in the late 1990s. 
Projects focused primarily on the economy were launched, among them, TRACECA 
(Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia), established in 1993 to link the Caucasus 
with Central Asia and Europe, those focused on transport infrastructure projects to 
attract international investment, or INOGATE (Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to 
Europe), established in 1995 to promote technical assistance and some investment for 
hydrocarbon infrastructure in the Wider Black Sea region. 
TACIS (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States), a 
programme for the support of economic and political transition in the post-Soviet region, 
concluded in December 2006 and was replaced by the European Neighbourhood and 
Partnership Instrument (ENPI). New National Action Plans have been agreed upon with 
each of the South Caucasian states. They are to lay out the strategic objectives of co-
operation within the region and with the EU for the upcoming years until 2011, and to 
                                                 
6 Bocutoğlu, Ersan/Koçer, Goekher, Politico-Economic Conflicts in the Black Sea Region in the Post-Cold War 
Era, in: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg/IFSH (ed.), OSCE-
Yearbook 2006, No. 12, Baden-Baden 2007, pp. 113. 
7 Kempe, Iris/Klotzle, Kurt, The Balkans and the Black Sea Region: Problems, Potentials, and Policy Options, CAP 
Policy Analysis No. 2, April 2006, p. 8. For the disappointment of several states, such as Moldova or Ukraine, at 
having no membership prospects see also: Aydin, Mustafa, Europe’s next shore: The Black Sea region after EU 
enlargement. EU-ISS Occasional Paper 53, June 2004, p. 11 and 13. 
KFIBS English Edition 2/07 
 4 
encourage and support further integration into European economic and social structures.8 
Due to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which prevents direct co-operation between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan, these ambitions can only be met in the most superficial way. 
Apart from that, the joint slogan of the EU has recently become to encourage 
participation rather than to give a perspective for a potential EU membership. However, 
this course of action might turn out tricky, because a priori lacking the perspective of a 
future admission into the EU could cause frustration and increasing unwillingness to 
further co-operate with the EU and to further support single EU activities in the region.9 
 
EU Activities in the South Caucasus 
 
In contrast to recent discord, the attitude towards the European Union within the entire 
Black Sea region may traditionally be described as overwhelmingly positive. Especially the 
South Caucasus has always felt to be strongly linked with Europe: several countries in the 
region wish to be part of the European Union in some form and regard their membership 
in the European Council as the first step to achieving this aim in the near future.10 In 
contrast to other international actors, the European Union is not expected to seek a new 
zone of influence here. However, Europe has, as yet, barely taken advantage of these 
positive perceptions. EU actions in the region remain functional without any ideational 
ulterior motives.11 This leads to a huge discrepancy between reality and the expectations 
of the South Caucasian states. Though excluded from the EU enlargement process, they 
are, at the same time, affected by global economic and development processes. 
The European Union has been active in the South Caucasian states since 1993, 
oriented to financial, humanitarian and technical (especially TACIS) support. This is 
regarded as a contribution towards stability, peace and prosperity in a region that is still 
                                                 
8
 For documents on the National Action Plans see the web page of the European Commission: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm>. 
9 This is already the case in Georgia. Since summer 2006, the Georgian government demands to put EU 
rehabilitation and democratisation programmes under Georgian control. See: Kaufmann, Walter, Politischer 
Jahresbericht. Suedlicher Kaukasus 2006/2007, Regionalbuero der Heinrich-Boell-Stiftung, Tbilisi, July 2007, pp. 
6ff. For more information on this aspect, see: Marchetti, Andreas, Widening without Enlarging. The European 
Neighbourhood Policy and the South Caucasus, in: Turkish Policy Quarterly, 5,2 (2006), S. 65-77, at: 
<http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_turkey_tpq_id_63.pdf>. 
10 As ICG rightly notices, the European Union and the European Council are frequently confused by people in the 
Black Sea region: ICG, Conflict Resolution in the South Caucasus: The EU’s Role, Europe Report No. 173, 20 
March 2006, p. 3. 
11 For more critical points on these aspects see: Valinakis, Yannis, The Black Sea Region: Challenges and 
Opportunities for Europe, WEU Chaillot Paper 36, July 1999, p. 14. 
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occupied with ethno-political conflicts.12 In the late 1990s Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreements were signed with all three South Caucasian states. Since 2000 there have been 
regular meetings between the European Parliament and the national parliaments of the 
region. The EU has become one of the leading trading partners in the South Caucasus 
region. In November 2006 "National Indicative Programmes 2007-2010" laid the 
priorities for the upcoming years.13 
Political presence, on the other hand, varies in the three South Caucasian states. 
The establishment of the European Commission’s office in Tbilisi was not a coincidence: 
"Si la Géorgie est traditionnellement considérée comme la capitale politique de la région, 
c’est d’abord dans cette capitale qu’une mission diplomatique a été ouverte. Mais lorsque 
les motivations économiques primaient, Bakou fut prioritaire."14 
The delegation of the Commission in Georgia is responsible for activities in Armenia as 
well, but not for Azerbaijan. Plans have finally been made to open a full-fledged office in 
Baku in 2007. However, the EU has remained reluctant to further political engagement in 
the South Caucasus with its still unresolved ethno-political conflicts. Still, EU activities in 
Georgia, compared to those in Armenia and Azerbaijan, are much more complex. While 
Georgia’s right to territorial integrity and its threat due to the conflicts with Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia were recognized a priori by all international actors operating in Georgia, 
the EU has hesitated to take sides in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution process. 
As the only interstate conflict in the region, it has severely damaged relations between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan. Though confidence-building programmes in and around 
Nagorno-Karabakh are urgently needed, the EU perceives this conflict region to be a 
lower priority compared to Abkhazia and South Ossetia due to the large amount of aid 
being transferred to Nagorno-Karabakh by the Armenian diaspora. At the same time, 
Azerbaijan has always been reluctant to accept projects, which involve a region whose 
ambition to secede is strongly encouraged by the Armenian state.15 As a result, the EU 
concentration on activities in Georgia was the logical consequence. 
                                                 
12 Cf. <http://www.mfa.gov.ge/eu.html>, 6 March 2003; 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/news/patten_remarks.htm>, 11 March 2003. 
13 For documents on ENP see the web page of the European Commission: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm>. 
14 A citation from Helly’s doctoral thesis saying that if Georgia was traditionally regarded to be the political centre of 
the region, then Baku was considered to be the regional centre in economic terms: Helly, Damien (2003), p. 173. 
15 Azerbaijan’s position will strengthen further this year, first, because of its growing military budget which will reach 
1 billion US dollars, exceeding Armenia’s entire state budget; second, because of Russian-American agreements 
during the G8 summit in Heiligendamm/Germany in recent days to establish a joint missile defence system in 
Azerbaijan, FAZ, 8 June 2007. 
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Georgia a Guinea Pig for EU Engagement in the Caucasus? 
 
Compared to Armenia and Azerbaijan, the EU has been particularly active in 
Georgia through funding, programmes and political statements. On 10 April 1997, a 
technical mission of the European Commission visited South Ossetia to discuss the 
possibilities of EU involvement in economic rehabilitation.16 The EC Delegation to 
Georgia and the OSCE Mission to Georgia consecutively signed a EU platform according 
to which the EC aims to support the process of reconciliation, to assist in the 
rehabilitation and improvement of socio-economic conditions, to assist in restarting the 
conflict-stricken economy and to promote the voluntary return of refugees and internally 
displaced to the conflict zone. The EU’s increasing interest in supporting peace and 
stability building measures in this conflict region manifests itself in various reports, 
statements, the TACIS programme and several Strategy Papers.17 The OSCE Mission to 
Georgia took the initiative of making the European Commission an observer of the 
quadripartite Joint Control Commission (JCC) in 2000, and a participant in the JCC in 
2001, and enabling the EC’s attendance at Experts’ Group meetings.18 Whether to also 
engage in the negotiation process of the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict has only been 
discussed tentatively.19 
Thus, most of EU’s engagement in post-conflict peace-building processes in 
Georgia remains focused on projects for economic reconstruction. EU policy is still 
broadly focused on a non-committal position, rather influenced by the national policies of 
individual EU member states, like France and the United Kingdom, which follow their 
own national interests in this region, and, for the time being, disapprove of a unique 
positioning or involvement of the European Union in the South Caucasus on many 
                                                 
16 CPC, REF, SEC/125/97, 22 April 1997, Mission to Georgia: Activity Report No. 6/97 for the Period of 1-15 
April 1997 (restr.). 
17 Cf. <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/georgia/csp/02_06_en.pdf>, 25 March 2003, p. 8; 
<http://www.ebrd.com/about/strategy/country/georgia/georgia.pdf>, 7 March 2003, p. 42; 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/news/comm2001_211_en.pdf>, 7 March 2003, p. 14f. For 
a detailed chronology of the instruments used by the European Union in the Caucasus see: Helly, Damien (2003), 
pp. 78ff. 
18 The Joint Control Commission and the Experts’ Group on the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict resolution 
process are the main negotiation mechanisms in this conflict. Georgia, South Ossetia, Russia and North Ossetia 
are members of the JCC. Both mechanisms derive from OSCE Mission to Georgia’s initiatives. See: Koenig, 
Marietta S, The Georgian-South Ossetian Conflict, in: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the 
University of Hamburg/IFSH (ed.), OSCE-Yearbook 2004, No. 10, Baden-Baden 2005, pp. 261ff. 
19 Wahlfeld, Monika (2003), p. 56. Author’s interviews in Tbilisi in autumn 2003. 
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points of broader issues.20 
Although the EU traditionally regards the work of conflict prevention to be more 
efficient than post-conflict management, it only engages in the conflict resolution process 
if a member state is already actively involved, such as, for example, Great Britain is said to 
be in Abkhazia.21 The International Crisis Group demands a breakdown of existing 
patterns and recommends increased engagement with the non-recognized entities (e.g. 
Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh) and in this way "to promote 
democratization, civil society development and the rule of law, not as recognition of 
status but as a means to break their isolation, build confidence and avoid exclusion from 
broad EU integration processes".22 
On the other hand, it is the European Union’s function as a significant donor in this 
region which, in contrast to the OSCE, at least puts at its disposal a set of "carrots and 
sticks". The EU either grants a remarkable amount of money that significantly helps to 
improve the situation in the conflict zone, or freezes grants if the expected results are too 
slow in coming. In this way the EU significantly influences the progress of the conflict 
management process. 
However, due to the now shared sea border, the European Union’s broadly 
focused approach to economic issues in the South Caucasus is slowly changing. In the 
decision-making framework of the General Affairs Council from 26 February 2001, the 
EU sought further possibilities for helping prevent and solve conflicts and supporting 
post-conflict rehabilitation in the South Caucasus.23 Moreover, Turkey may join the 
European Union in the future, which would create a common land border between the 
EU and the South Caucasus. This is slowly becoming apparent to the EU as well, and in 
response they have already started to change their focus.24 On 7 July 2003, the Council, 
willing to play a slightly more active political role in the South Caucasus, appointed Heikki 
Talvitie as an EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus (EUSR). But his mandate 
                                                 
20 Ibid, p. 5. However, in another place Helly also notes that at this point financial participation of the European 
Union in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict resolution process is the only way the EU can be helpful: Helly, Damien 
(2003), pp. 91 and 225. Boden also urges stronger involvement of the European Union in the conflict resolution 
process and asks the European Union to draft a stability concept for the Caucasus region: Boden, Dieter (2002), p. 
45. For the role of a Caucasus stability pact and the relevance of a peaceful Caucasus region for the whole Europe 
see, passim, Erler, Gernot (2002). 
21 Cf. <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/news/patten_remarks.htm>, 11 March 2003; Helly, 
Damien (2003), p. 225. 
22 ICG Europe Report No. 173 (2006), p. 4. 
23 Cf. <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/georgia/csp/02_06_en.pdf>, 25 March 2003, p. 3. 
24 <http://europa.ei.int/comm/external_relations/news/10_99/pres_99_302.htm>, 6 March 2003. 
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was considered to be quite vague.25 Since February 2006 this position has been held by 
Peter Semneby. Unlike Talvitie, Semneby is now being encouraged to "contribute" to the 
regional conflict settlement processes.26 His engagement has already become visible in 
various statements in which he for example condemns recent Georgian actions carried 
out in the Georgian-Abkhaz border region (Kodory valley), and in the promotion of 
Caucasus-related projects and meetings at his duty station in Brussels. 
 
Changes after Georgia’s "Velvet Revolution" 
 
In the course of the governmental changes in Georgia leading to the election of 
the western-oriented Mikhail Saakashvili as new president of Georgia, Tbilisi and the 
European Commission Delegation signed an agreement in 2004 in accordance with which 
the EU allocated 28 million Euro, within the framework of the EU’s technical assistance 
programme (TACIS), to further assist Georgia in covering the cost of reforms within the 
healthcare, legal and administrative sectors, and rehabilitation programmes in the post-
conflict zones.27 Particularly, as related to the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict, the 
parties to the conflict and the EC signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on 
rehabilitation projects in the conflict zone in Tskhinvali on 31 January 2004. The 
European Commission agreed to give 2.5 million Euros to finance several new projects, 
which would focus on rehabilitation of basic infrastructure in the conflict zone.28 Since 
the majority of projects in South Ossetia are tied to the political dialogue process with the 
Joint Control Commission (JCC), with implementation dependent on agreement among 
the four parties (Georgia, Russia, South and North Ossetia), the EU appears to be more 
directly engaged in the conflict resolving process in South Ossetia than in Abkhazia where 
direct co-operation has always been only at grassroots level. 
In 2005, EU ambitions to contribute more actively to rehabilitation programmes in 
Abkhazia increased significantly. By mid-2006 implementing projects worth some 25 
million Euros made the EU the largest donor in Abkhazia (as the EU had already been in 
                                                 
25 Official Journal of the European Union, L 169/74, 8 July 2003, Council Joint Action 2003/496/CFSP of 7 July 
2003 concerning the appointment of an EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus; author’s interview in 
Tbilisi. 
26 Council Joint Action 2006/121/CFSP of 21 February 2006, Article 3 (d), OJ L49, p. 15. 
27 Civil Georgia – Online Magazine, EU Allocates 28 million Euro to Assist Georgia, 14 January 2004. 
28 OSCE-Newsline, OSCE Brokers Funds to Help Rehabilitate the Zone of the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict, Tbilisi, 
2 February 2004; ICG, Conflict Resolution in the South Caucasus: The EU’s Role, Europe Report No. 173, 20 
March 2006, p. 19. 
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South Ossetia). Ten million Euros alone have been allotted for the rehabilitation of the 
Enguri Hydro Power plant, a prestigious object, since it is the single project, which 
demonstrates that Georgian-Abkhaz co-operation is, indeed, possible.29 Beyond that 
allocation of funds, the EU has, as yet, no ambition to actively carry out its own projects 
in Abkhazia, which would be required in the security sector, arms control or 
improvements in rule of law through policing projects.30 In June 2004, the Commission 
organized a first-ever donors’ conference during which pledges of nearly 1 billion US 
dollars were made.31 
However, the Georgian "Velvet Revolution" also had an overall impact on the 
EU’s policy towards the three South Caucasian states. This was clearly indicated in the 26 
January 2004 proposal of the EUSR, Heikki Talvitie, to reverse the decision from the 
previous summer to leave Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia out of the "Wider Europe 
Initiative".32 The developments in Georgia indicated that there might be a breakthrough 
within the domestic policy of Georgia, since Saakashvili promised to fight against 
corruption and to push ahead with long-awaited reforms.33 Not only since Saakashvili’s 
presidency, but now, more strongly promoted than ever, Georgia is seeking a closer and 
stronger relationship with the European Union, and hopes to be able to join the Union 
one day. This is visibly demonstrated by EU flags on the government building in the 
centre of Tbilisi. In addition to that Saakashvili has eagerly requested stronger EU 
engagement in the conflict resolution processes with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The 
EU, meanwhile, remains reluctant to take on a greater role, so as not to interfere in 
Russia’s activities, as long as EU involvement is not considered to significantly promote 
stability.34 Western observers, though, now demand this engagement, as well. The 
International Crisis Group openly recommended in March 2006 that the EU should 
                                                 
29 The EU finances two projects: the dam on the Georgian side and a power station generator on the Abkhaz side. 
Abkhazia basically receives electricity from this hydro power plant. 
30 ICG, Conflict Resolution in the South Caucasus: The EU’s Role, Europe Report No. 173, 20 March 2006, p. 18. 
31 European Commission and World Bank, "International donors give extraordinary support to Georgia: approx. 1 
billion US dollars/850 million Euros pledged", Joint Press Release, Brussels, 16 June 2004, at: 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/georgia/intro/press170604.pdf>. 
32 Kupatadze, Georgy, Georgia: Debate Over Military Bases, in: IWPR’s Caucasus Reporting Service No. 215, 22 January 
2004; Lobjakas, Ahto, EU to Reconsider Exclusion of South Caucasus States from ‘Wider Europe’ Program, in: RFE/RL 
Caucasus Report Vol. 7, No. 5, 30 January 2004. 
33 Civil Georgia – Online Magazine, Solana Pledged EU’s Support to Georgia, 15 January 2004. According to the 
Transparency International Index from 2003 Georgia is, together with Angola and Azerbaijan, ranking on position 
124 of 133 positions altogether. 
34 See: ICG, Conflict Resolution in the South Caucasus: The EU’s Role, Europe Report No. 173, 20 March 2006, 
recommendations, p. 10. 
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participate in relevant fora, at least as an observer.35 This unwillingness on EU ’s side to 
further engage plus the lack of perspective of Georgia’s future admission into the EU has 
already caused frustration and increasing unwillingness to further co-operate with the EU 
and to further support EU activities.36 
In February 2006, an open hearing took place in Brussels, where the European 
Parliament’s Foreign Commission discussed the EU’ s future role in the South Caucasus 
and the possible creation of a South Caucasus and Black Sea region stability pact. In the 
long term this would be far more binding than the present European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP), which for many, is not much more than mere lip service, bilaterally 
oriented with a strong focus, again, on economic issues.37 On how the new European 
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) could help to overcome this 
dilemma remains to be seen. 
However, Georgia’s position cannot be compared to Ukraine. The so-called 
Orange Revolution likewise enjoyed strong Western support. Despite serious internal 
problems which can be observed for years already, Ukraine has a far more realistic chance 
of one day being admitted to the EU than Georgia. For the time being, however, the EU 
is rather focused on its future role in Central Asia.38 The South Caucasian states need to 
engage themselves and to prove their reliability by implementing fundamental reforms. 
Only when decisive development and reform efforts have been demonstrated, can the 
European Union again focus on the South Caucasus. Currently the increasing 
concentration on Central Asia and a purely economic focus on the Black Sea region as an 
energy supply route leave them out. 
 
Current Pipeline Projects 
 
In recent years a unique footrace has started in the Wider Black Sea region. Russia, 
the European Union and the USA are competing for supremacy over the pipeline route 
                                                 
35 ICG, Conflict Resolution in the South Caucasus: The EU’s Role, Europe Report No. 173, 20 March 2006, 
recommendations, pp. iif. 
36 See FN 9. 
37 Cf. Vahl, Marius, The EU and Black Sea Regional Cooperation: Some Challenges for BSEC, CEPS Commentaries, 
April 2005, p. 1. 
38
 For an overview on this aspect see: The EU and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership, Policy Paper 
published by the German Presidency of the European Council, at: 
<http://www.diplo.de/diplo/en/Europa/Aussenpolitik/Regionalabkommen/EU-CentralAsia-Strategy.pdf>. 
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system leading from the Caspian Sea to Europe.39 Europe is especially worried about its 
increasing energy dependence on Russia. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline became 
one of the first prestigious projects in the Wider Black Sea region. This pipeline carries 
crude oil from the oil fields in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan on the Caspian Sea to Ceyhan 
on the Mediterranean Sea. With a length of 1.760 km this pipeline was meant to make the 
West more independent of OPEC oil in the Persian Gulf region. Transit country Georgia 
is already profiting remarkably from this pipeline. The state budget has increased 
significantly,40 which has aroused the interests of other countries in the region in 
promoting further pipeline projects. This is especially the case for those that help to 
liberate them from dependency on Russian energy supplies which, in past years, has often 
been used as a lever to enforce Russian political interests in the region. However, the 
realization of this intention might prove to be difficult, when observing recent Russian 
activities in the energy sector. 
Parallel to the BTC pipeline, the Blue Stream pipeline was officially inaugurated in 
2005. This pipeline carries Russian natural gas from Stawropol to the Krasnodar region 
and beneath the Black Sea to Samsun in Turkey terminating 444 km further in Ankara. In 
March 2007, Russia attended the signing of a treaty between Bulgaria and Greece for a 
new "Balkan pipeline", which will connect the Aegean with the Black Sea. Russia has a 51 
per cent share in this project. 
The decisive step followed in May 2007, when Russia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan 
and Kazakhstan agreed on a landmark gas pipeline deal. The Caspian shore gas pipeline 
with a capacity of 10 billion cubic meters per year and a parallel gas pipeline, yet to be 
built, will go from Turkmenistan to Russia via Kazakhstan. For the European states this 
meant a grave reversal. After two consecutive winters that saw Russia briefly disrupt 
energy supplies to Europe due to Russian-Ukrainian and Russian-Belarus disagreements, 
the European Union had intensified plans to tap directly into Central Asia’s natural gas, 
bypassing Russian involvement. The 3.300 km long Nabucco pipeline would have 
transported gas from Turkey via Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary to Austria, starting from 
2011. 
However, smaller EU countries like Hungary were not so eager to support this 
                                                 
39 Aydin, Mustafa, Europe’s next shore: The Black Sea region after EU enlargement. EU-ISS Occasional Paper 53, 
June 2004, p. 7. 
40 However, Georgian NGOs are critical of the fact that local Georgia is not yet directly profiting from this income. 
KFIBS English Edition 2/07 
 12 
project, but rather preferred to maintain relations with the Russian Federation and the 
state-owned Russian gas monopoly Gazprom. Now, with the Russian-Turkmen-Kazakh 
coup, the pipelines will run north from the Caspian Sea through Russia. Moscow, which 
buys Turkmen gas at below-market rates, is likely to sell the Caspian gas to Europe at a 
substantial markup. The EU’s non-stringent energy policy led to the failure of the 
Nabucco project. Right now, the EU needs time to digest its failure. Meanwhile, rumours 
suggest that the Gazprom coup has encouraged the USA to press ahead more eagerly 
with the Nabucco project, concentrating on Azeri and Iranian gas. One will have to 
observe what happens in the upcoming months to learn more about this issue. 
 
Forms of Regional Co-operation in the Black Sea Region 
 
With the downfall of the Soviet Union the first dawning interests in regional co-
operation – primarily in economic terms – arose in several Black Sea states.41 While most 
co-operative frameworks, such as the informal security alliance GUAM, are restricted to a 
few states, there are hardly any, such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), 
which are open to any state willing to participate. On the other hand, many countries 
were eager to find alternatives to the CIS format that, in many eyes, was imposed and was 
only reluctantly accepted. In June 1992, the BSEC was launched when the heads of state 
or governments signed a summit declaration (known as "Istanbul Declaration"). With the 
ratification of the BSEC Charter by the parliaments of eleven member states (Albania, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, 
Turkey and Ukraine), BSEC acquired an international legal identity and with that became 
a regional organization on 1 May 1999. The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs being 
BSEC’s principal decision-making body has a Permanent International Secretariat 
(PERMIS), which is based in Istanbul. Two of the four related bodies are based in 
Istanbul as well: the BSEC Business Council and the Parliamentary Assembly, while the 
International Center for Black Sea Studies is based in Athens, and the Black Sea Trade & 
Development Bank is based in Thessaloniki. Thus BSEC became the only co-operative 
initiative in the Black Sea region, imbedded in a basic institutional system. 
However, in the second half of the 1990s the attractiveness of BSEC began to 
                                                 
41 For more detailed information on regionalism in the Wider Black Sea region see: Aydin, Mustafa, Europe’s next 
shore: The Black Sea region after EU enlargement. EU-ISS Occasional Paper 53, June 2004, pp. 19ff. 
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decline. Several member states still had to deal with unresolved ethno-political conflicts. 
Parties to the conflicts were member states of the same organization. Even today several 
interstate and intrastate borders are still closed, former relevant train connections in the 
region are non-continuous due to these closed borders, and significant sections of the 
railway systems are in very bad condition. Different historical perceptions, unequal access 
to resources, and the lack of a joint vision of priorities have aggravated the situation. This, 
in turn, has prevented BSCE from establishing further institutions to build capacities for 
joint action and for the creation of a joint security pact, to become attractive e.g. for co-
operation with the EU. BSEC has given the impression of being disorganized. It has 
remained a forum with non-binding mechanisms. No consensus has yet been able to be 
achieved in terms of regional leadership. Several states bordering the sea, such as Ukraine, 
Bulgaria and Romania, are seeking a leading role in the Black Sea region. Greece also 
wishes to play a decisive role arguing, before Romania’s and Bulgaria’s admission to the 
EU, to have been representing the EU at the Black Sea coastline. 
Apart from that, international actors have also started to regard each other as 
opponents in the aforementioned region. Russia disapproved of US action in this area 
that was formerly Russia’s "near abroad". This view is, at least to some extent, also shared 
by Turkey, which believes that states without ocean access should have only limited 
influence on Black Sea security issues.42 This was a setback for US policy that had wished 
to deploy Turkey as a balancing factor against the further expansion of Russian, and 
Iranian, influence. Meanwhile, the USA has criticized the EU, calling it "the great 
absentee", for merely declaring actions in the region, without actually becoming involved. 
NATO actions, which, in the opinion of the US, would be the most effective, are 
disapproved of by the EU and certainly by Russia.43 Russia has been very reluctant to 
accept any NATO actions in the post-Soviet hemisphere. Many of the recent 
disagreements between Russia and the Black Sea countries busy with coloured revolutions 
(Georgia and the Ukraine), derive from their strong ambitions to be admitted as full 
                                                 
42 Cf. Petersen, Phillip A, The Black Sea: Frontier Zone or "European" Sea?, in: Review of International Affairs No. 
1122, June 2006, p. 24. 
43 Bocutoğlu, Ersan/Koçer, Goekher, Politico-Economic Conflicts in the Black Sea Region in the Post-Cold War 
Era, in: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg/IFSH (ed.), OSCE-
Yearbook 2006, No. 12, Baden-Baden 2007, pp. 118 and 121; Ryabtsev, Vladimir, Why is there no "Security 
Complex" in the Black Sea-Caucasus Region?, in: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University 
of Hamburg/IFSH (ed.), OSCE-Yearbook 2006, No. 12, Baden-Baden 2007, pp. 106f. For a plea on a stronger 
US involvement in the Wider Black Sea region see also: Socor, Vladimir, Advancing Euro-Atlantic Security and 
Democracy in the Black Sea Region, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on 
European Affairs, March 2005, p. 6. 
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members to NATO.44 
In addition to that there is a strong regional scepticism towards Russia and, as 
already being mentioned, there have also been protests against various Russian-led 
pipeline projects, particularly by smaller countries.45 This results from Russia’s failure to 
present an attractive policy, which would encourage co-operation in its immediate 
neighbourhood. Instead, economic issues favouring those neighbours who are willing to 
accept and support Russia’s post-Soviet leading position dominate Russia’s policy. Russia 
is struggling for a long-term leading position in the area of the former Soviet Union. This 
became glaringly obvious during the elections in Georgia, Ukraine, and Belarus, where 
Russian officials exploited personal networks and high-level meetings to influence 
domestic political outcomes in its "near abroad". Especially Georgia reacted harshly to 
this intervention, and Georgian-Russian relations have been severely damaged, because 
both sides are no longer able to communicate in a co-operative way. Russia’s challenge 
will be to develop a constructive policy, which also takes democratic values and local 
interests into consideration. The states in the former "near abroad" seek to be recognized 
as equal partners of Russia. Given the hardened positions especially in Georgian-Russian 
relations there is still a lot to be done. 
 
Closing Remarks 
 
Parallel to the South-East European stability pact, leading Caucasus analysts promoted a 
Caucasus stability pact in May 2000.46 According to them this would have been a road 
map for trilateral co-operation among the EU, Russia and the US. Much of this may 
sound naïve today. However, in the long term, only co-operative actions between the 
global and the regional players can lead to stability, security and prosperity of the Wider 
                                                 
44 For NATO activities in the Wider Black Sea region see: Cornell, Svante/Jonsson, Anna/Nilsson/Niklas/ 
Haeggstroem, Per, The Wider Black Sea Region: An Emerging Hub in European Security, Central Asia Caucasus 
Institute & Silk Road Studies Program. Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center of Johns Hopkins 
University (Washington, D.C.) and Uppsala University (Uppsala), Dec. 2006, pp. 66ff. Russia’s perceived exclusive 
right to deploy peace-keepers in its "near abroad" is also felt by the United Nations. With Russia being a 
permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia succeeded in opposing UN peace-keeping on post-Soviet 
territory, limiting UN. 
45 The crisis in Estonia is certainly connected to "North Stream", the natural gas pipeline currently being built, that 
runs beneath the Baltic Sea from Russian Vyborg to Greifswald in Germany. 
46 In parts antiquated already, but still worth reading: Celac, Sergiu, Emerson, Michael, A Stability Pact for the 
Caucasus, a new deal for the whole region, incorporating: a South Caucasus Community, Russian/EU/US 
Southern Dimension cooperation, enhanced Black Sea-Caucasus-Caspian cooperation. A consultative document 
for the CEPS Task Force for the Caucasus, Working Document No. 145, May 2000. 
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Black Sea region.47 
To achieve this, support for regional co-operation would be crucial. For this to 
happen, the EU should support reform processes in the Black Sea region by providing 
financial resources, training and technical support. A focus on elections and civil society 
alone, such as can be observed at the moment, is a shaky barometer for successful 
transformation. The EU has to concentrate on supporting functioning state institutions. 
For that reason, democracy promotion may not be simultaneously the aim and means. 
Rather an instrumental framework needs to be established, which enables local 
communities to develop autonomous mechanisms for economic and political 
transformation, which, in the long term, may lead to full-fledged democratic standards. 
Supporting further institutionalization of BSEC may enable this regional organization to 
become a promoter for spreading European norms and values in the Black Sea region. 
The EU should enhance co-operative projects with the Black Sea states to resolve 
regional security problems, which lead to transnational threats, such as ongoing ethno-
political conflicts, organized crime, terrorist activity, weapons’ proliferation and state 
fragility.48 This implies an efficient visa policy and energy security programmes. Again 
BSEC could play a crucial role here in creating binding mechanisms for its member states. 
Meanwhile, these states would naturally follow these commitments, with BSEC being the 
main regional actor, strengthening their geostrategic position, including a possible future 
integration into Europe for those who still wish to. As a member state of BSEC, Russia 
could profit from that by encouraging the parties to the conflict to start co-operating 
economically, to open borders for economic actions and to engage in re-establishing 
important interstate railway connections which would directly link Russia with the 
Caucasus and Central Asia. 
To feel secure, the EU needs to be surrounded by states which feel committed to 
democratic norms and values. However, this calls for a stronger, political engagement in 
the Wider Black Sea region. The EU needs to become more involved in conflict 
resolution processes. The EU has shirked any responsibility for the ethno-political 
conflicts – the key problem of the region. "Europeanization" may play a crucial role 
                                                 
47 Kempe, Iris/Klotzle, Kurt, The Balkans and the Black Sea Region: Problems, Potentials, and Policy Options, CAP 
Policy Analysis No. 2, April 2006, p. 10. 
48 The BSEC Council adopted their Economic Agenda for the Future in 2001 to serve as a "road map" for regional 
projects dealing with the above-mentioned threats. 
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here.49 However, the race for domination in the energy sector has shown that in the long 
term the European Union will strongly depend on good and close relations with the 
Russian Federation. To become a serious partner, the EU needs to seek constructive 
dialogue with Russia. This will only be possible when Russia sees the EU not as a 
competitor in the Black Sea region, but as a co-operative partner. Reviving TRACECA 
with its implied serious political commitment and significant financial resources might 
contribute to a reformation of Europe’s present disastrous energy policy – and at the 
same time actively include Russia in this process. Only with an institutionalised focus on 
the Black Sea region and active engagement, will make the EU a durable impact on its 
recently acquired home waters. 
 
                                                 
49 See: Coppieters, Bruno et al., European Institutional Models as Instruments of Conflict Resolution in the Divided 
States of the European Periphery, CEPS Working Document 195 (Brussels: CEPS, July 2003); Valinakis, Yannis, 
The Black Sea Region: Challenges and Opportunities for Europe, WEU Chaillot Paper 36, July 1999, p. 17. 
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